Türkiye-Ghana Foreign Relations: A Comprehensive Analysis

This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the diplomatic relations between Ghana and Türkiye, tracing their historical trajectory and examining the key events that have shaped bilateral engagement. Situated within the frameworks of foreign policy analysis, African Studies, and International Relations, this study adopts a multidisciplinary approach to investigate the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of this relationship. Particular attention is given to the domestic and international factors influencing the evolution of Türkiye–Ghana ties, with emphasis on trade and economic cooperation, diplomatic initiatives, and shared geopolitical interests. The analysis also considers the impact of broader global transformations—including shifts in the international political and economic landscape—on bilateral relations. In doing so, this study identifies both the opportunities and the challenges confronting Ghana and Türkiye in their efforts to deepen cooperation. By integrating historical and contemporary perspectives, this study offers valuable insights for policymakers, scholars, and practitioners concerned with the dynamics of international diplomacy and the emerging role of Türkiye in Africa.

Introduction

Since the turn of the 21^st Century, Africa has experienced tremendous socioeconomic and technological change, which has created a unique need for interaction with the rest of the world (Signé, 2020). In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, African governments committed to economic reform and liberalization, which led to a profound economic transformation that promoted a more equitable level of prosperity for African people while making the continent more appealing to regional and global business partners (Radelet, 2010). Over the past 20 years, some African nations have experienced some of the fastest economic developments in the world, and the proportion of Africans living in poverty has dropped by 16 percentage points. Although a large portion of this progress has been endangered by the COVID-19 epidemic, the continent has already begun to recover, and projections for the decrease in poverty remain positive. Thus, the next several decades will present enormous potential for corporations, governments, and the public to profit from the significant changes occurring on the continent if Africa is able to overcome the bane of its development, corruption.

However, for a long time, Africa was viewed by the West as an inferior and ancillary player in world affairs. The continent has frequently been viewed as either a resource base that must be mined for gmore beneficial uses elsewhere or as a place beset by poverty, conflict, or natural disasters that require global assistance (Edoho, 2011). To put it mildly, this understanding of Africa must be revised because it is narrow-minded. Given the fierce competition from emerging geopolitical players on the African continent, the West is no longer able to depend on the same unconventional diplomatic methods or strategies that have been employed for decades (Haruna, 2023). Over the last 30 years, Türkiye’s influence on the continent has gradually increased. This has resulted in greater diplomatic ties between Türkiye and several African nations including Ghana. Türkiye’s relationship with Africa is driven by win-win economic strategies, mutually beneficial humanitarian aid, and symbiotic security considerations (Haruna, 2024). Additionally, Ankara emphasized that its future ties with the African continent will be guided by the core principles of fair collaboration and mutual benefit (Korkut & Civelekoglu, 2013).

Diplomatic interactions between nations play a pivotal role in shaping the global geopolitical landscape, fostering economic cooperation, and addressing shared transnational challenges. Among the myriad relationships that define the international community, the connection between Ghana and Türkiye represents a testament to the intricate dynamics of modern foreign relations. Ghana, with its rich history and diverse cultural heritage, and Türkiye, positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, have engaged in diplomatic ties that traverse geographical and historical boundaries. Understanding the nuances of their interactions requires a multifaceted approach that considers the socio-political evolution of both nations and the broader international context.

The interdisciplinary nature of Türkiye-Ghana relations allows for a nuanced examination of various dimensions, including political alignment, economic cooperation, and cultural exchanges. Furthermore, this study scrutinizes the impact of global events on Türkiye-Ghana relations, shedding light on how changes in the international arena reverberate through the bilateral dynamics of these countries. Intricately woven into this analysis is the consideration of the challenges and opportunities that both nations encounter when navigating their relationships. By peeling the layers of diplomatic discourse, this paper endeavors to provide not only a retrospective understanding of Türkiye-Ghana diplomatic relations but also a forward-looking perspective that informs policy decisions and academic discourse. As the ensuing pages unfold, the reader will embark on a journey through the historical epochs and contemporary landscapes that have defined and continue to mold the intricate tapestry of Türkiye-Ghana foreign relations. By delving into the historical roots of their engagement and dissecting contemporary developments, this paper aims to unravel the factors that have shaped and continue to influence diplomatic ties between these two great nations.

The study employs a multidisciplinary approach, drawing on insights from foreign policy analysis, African studies, and international relations. Key areas of exploration include trade and economic cooperation, diplomatic engagement, and shared geopolitical interests. The discussion also assesses the impact of global events on bilateral relationships, such as changes in the international political landscape and economic shifts. Furthermore, the study highlights the challenges and opportunities faced by both countries in fostering stronger ties. By examining the historical trajectory and current state of Türkiye-Ghana relations, this discussion provides valuable insights for policymakers, scholars, and practitioners interested in the dynamics of international diplomacy.

Methodology

This study adopts a qualitative research design, specifically a case study approach, to provide an in-depth exploration of Türkiye–Ghana relations. According to Yin (2018), the case study method is particularly useful when investigating a contemporary phenomenon within its real-world context, especially where the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. This design allows for a comprehensive examination of the historical, political, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions of Türkiye–Ghana relations. The choice of a qualitative design is further justified by the exploratory nature of the study. As Bryman (2016) argues, qualitative inquiry is well-suited for capturing meanings, perspectives, and narratives that cannot be reduced to quantitative measurement. Given the centrality of diplomatic practices, policy discourses, and bilateral cooperation frameworks, a qualitative design is the most appropriate for addressing the study objectives.

The case study focuses on Türkiye–Ghana relations as a single unit of analysis within the broader framework of Türkiye’s Africa policy and Ghana’s foreign policy orientation. This approach enables both diachronic and synchronic analysis: diachronic in terms of tracing developments from the early 1960s to the present, and synchronic in terms of situating bilateral relations within regional (ECOWAS, AU) and global contexts. Stake (1995) emphasizes that case studies are particularly relevant when the aim is to achieve a holistic understanding of complex social and political processes. Thus, the Türkiye–Ghana case offers insights into how middle powers engage with African states, and how African states reciprocally position themselves in an evolving multipolar world.

Data for this study was collected from both primary and secondary sources in order to ensure depth and triangulation. Primary sources included official documents such as policy statements, communiqués, bilateral agreements, and press releases issued by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ghana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, and respective embassies, as well as speeches and statements delivered during high-level visits and summits. Secondary sources supplemented these materials, including peer-reviewed journal articles, academic books, and policy reports from organizations such as the African Union, ECOWAS, and the United Nations. In addition, media coverage from established Turkish, Ghanaian, and international outlets were consulted to capture wider public narratives and discursive framings of Türkiye–Ghana relations. Collectively, these diverse data sources provided both empirical evidence and interpretive insights necessary for a comprehensive analysis.

The study employs a qualitative data analysis strategy that combines content analysis and discourse analysis to generate a comprehensive understanding of Türkiye–Ghana relations. Content analysis, as Schreier (2012) highlights, is valuable for structuring large amounts of textual data while preserving contextual meaning, thereby allowing patterns and trends to emerge. Complementing this, discourse analysis was applied to speeches, policy statements, and media representations to interrogate the narratives, framings, and legitimizing discourses that underpin bilateral relations (Fairclough, 2003). The integration of these approaches ensures that both the material and ideational dimensions of Türkiye–Ghana diplomatic ties are captured, providing an empirically grounded and interpretively rich analysis.

Türkiye in Ghana: a Historical Perspective

The Ottoman era, during which the Islamic Caliphate extended its dominance over North Africa in the sixteenth century, was when Türkiye’s relationship with Africa began. Subsequently, Ottoman rule expanded toward the Sahel and over the Mediterranean and Red Seas (Parrey, 1958). The Ottoman Empire dominated Africa for four centuries, instituting five different systems of administration in Egypt, Algeria, Eritrea, Libya, and Tunisia. As part of the preparations for the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Ottoman forces fled the continent in 1922, ceding control of their strongholds to European colonists. Despite the extensive Ottoman legacy, scholars have not yet conducted a thorough analysis of the continent. At this juncture in Türkiye’s Republican status, the political attention of the state was focused on the Western world.

Throughout the early phases of Türkiye’s presence in Africa, the Ottoman Empire, and subsequently the Republic of Türkiye, were unaware of other regions of the continent, especially in the sub-Saharan area. During the Ottoman era, certain links were established (albeit not formal or consistent) with notable African empires and kingdoms such as the Hausa Kingdoms and the Kanem-Bornu Empire. The Ottoman Empire became noticeable in the southern portion of the continent in 1861 with the establishment of the Ottoman Honorary Consulate in Cape Town, South Africa, and the sending of the first Ottoman Imam, Abu Bakr Effendi, to the Muslim community (Haruna, 2023; Mehmet & Akgün, 2010). Cultural relationships even affected certain populations in West Africa. For instance, the Ottoman Empire bestowed the title of “Bey” on Mouhamed Shita, the leader of the Muslim community, in 1894 when it assisted in the construction of a mosque in Lagos. Nonetheless, sub-Saharan Africa was commonly perceived as a remote geographical region of destitution, starvation, contagious illnesses, and internal conflicts. There was a clear Turkish influence on both Sudan and the Horn of Africa. However, the bond was not as intimate as that established in Northern Africa (van den Berg & Meester, 2019).

Following the declaration of Ghana’s independence on March 6, 1957, diplomatic ties were established between Ghana and Türkiye in 1958. The Turkish Embassy in Accra began operations in 1964, was dissolved in 1981 because of austerity measures, and then reopened on February 1, 2010. The Republic of Ghana’s Embassy was established in Ankara in 2012. The prospects for strengthening bilateral relations were significantly advanced by the presidential visits, notably the 2011 visit to Ghana by Abdullah Gul, then President of Turkiye, and the reciprocal visit to Turkiye, from 21 to 24 January 2013, by John Dramani Mahama, the then President of the Republic of Ghana. The visit by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Ghana from February 29 to March 1, 2016, also marked a significant development in bilateral ties. A total of 150 Turkish businessmen and their Ghanaian counterparts attended a business roundtable conducted during the visit. Finally, from January 11 to January 14, 2020, Shirley Ayorkor Botchwey, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration of the Republic of Ghana, paid an official visit to Türkiye.

Ghana and Türkiye enjoyed closer development partnerships. Turkish businesses are primarily involved in Ghana’s construction and energy industries. Türkiye and Ghana’s bilateral trade volume increased from 399.5 million USD in 2015 to 478.9 million USD in 2016. There were 353.3 million USD in commerce between the two nations as of 2018. The principal items that Türkiye exports to Ghana include chemical fertilizers, pasta, flour, insulated cables and wires, iron and steel products, and cement. The three major imports to Türkiye are cotton, cocoa and its derivatives and gold. The Joint Economic Commission has met four times thus far. The Commission’s most recent meeting took place in Accra, Ghana, from April 14 to 16, 2014. Mutual business visits have facilitated improvements in bilateral trade and commercial relations thanks to the efforts of the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board and many Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Türkiye in collaboration with their Ghanaian counterparts. Through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, Türkiye offers Ghana development aid in several areas. Turkish Airlines operate flights to Accra seven times per week. Ghanaian students have been recipients of scholarship from the Turkish government since 1992.

The Current Türkiye-Ghana Relations in Perspective

According to official narratives from the Turkish Foreign Ministry (TFM), the Republic of Türkiye has always had cordial diplomatic relations with African nations (Turkish Foreign Ministry, 2008). This claim is valid only if it is believed that having no relationship is a sign of outstanding relationships. As we have previously indicated, very little attention has been paid to events in Africa since the establishment of the modern democratic Republic of Türkiye. Türkiye’s only familiarity with Africa came from formal or informal stories that portrayed the continent as a famine-stricken, disaster-destined, and violence-prone region. This misperception contributes to a lack of accurate and trustworthy information about Africa in both official and academic settings. Thus, given that the African continent has historically been studied only in the context of global politics, it has long been challenging for researchers to find Turkish experts on African affairs. The Turkish government’s 1998 adoption of what it called the “Opening Up to Africa Policy” provided further details on the elements of Türkiye’s then-emerging complex foreign policy approach. Presumably, the drive to forge close diplomatic ties with Africa was a response to the Union’s 1997 summit decision to reject Türkiye’s candidacy for EU membership. It is important to note that Türkiye has attempted to join the European Union since 1987. However, discussions about membership have stagnated since 2016. Thus, Türkiye’s desire to deepen its political, cultural, and economic ties with African nations was a strategic diplomatic move.

As I have already indicated, following the 2010 reopening of the Turkish diplomatic mission in Ghana’s capital, Accra, ties between the two countries have strengthened. President Abdullah Gül travelled to Ghana in March 2011 to strengthen existing diplomatic relations and establish new ones not only with Ghana but also with other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Even though President Gül's visit lasted only two days, from March 23 to 24, it was deemed special because it gave him the rare opportunity to address the Ghanaian parliament. Ghana is sometimes referred to as the “gateway” to Africa due to its significant impact throughout the continent; hence, his visit was a success. This was indeed the first time a Turkish president spoke to parliament in a country in sub-Saharan Africa.

In a symbolic move, John Dramani Mahama, the president of Ghana at the time, visited Türkiye in early 2013 as his first foreign state visit, highlighting the close ties between the two democratic states. Given that Ghanaian foreign policy circles were less familiar with Türkiye than with the United Kingdom and the United States, this led many political observers to doubt the visit. In terms of Middle Eastern connections, Ghana has only really become close to Israel, Lebanon, and to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Following President John Mahama’s 2013 visit, Ghana received a reciprocal visit from the newly elected President of Türkiye on March 1, 2016. President Erdoğan’s diplomatic visit to Ghana demonstrated Türkiye’s commitment to building positive relations with the country. Additionally, the visit demonstrated Türkiye’s willingness to deepen its influence in Ghana in particular, and sub-Saharan Africa as a whole; a process Türkiye began when it proclaimed 2005 to be the Year of Africa. Türkiye’s current diplomatic relations with Ghana encompass several sectors. In other words, Türkiye employed diverse foreign policy tools to cement its relations with Ghana, including humanitarian aid, trade, and economic cooperation, among others.

Humanitarian Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool

Most countries participate in the foreign aid process as donors, recipients, or both. Governments use foreign aid as a weapon to achieve their foreign policy goals. Withdrawing aid can be a viable tool to overthrow unfriendly or diametrically opposed regimes or inflict economic hardship on undemocratic states. Alternatively, foreign aid may be provided to encourage and sustain a welcoming or compliant government (Apodaca, 2017). Over the past decade and a half, aid has played a significant role in Türkiye’s larger foreign policy, particularly in relation to its African strategy (Mahamat, 2016). In this context, foreign aid is regarded as an element of soft power in foreign policy decision-making. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) is a state-run aid organization that presently has offices throughout many African states as part of Türkiye’s foreign policy instruments to positively impact the continent's development (Çevik, 2019; Tarik, 2007).

Historically, TIKA was first established to support nation-states going through transitions in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans. However, in 2003, it underwent reorganization of policies that increased its operational reach. Türkiye hopes to strengthen its ties with Africa by being visible there, and three of its regional offices have worked on projects in more than 37 African countries. Türkiye has pledged to provide technical assistance to African countries through TIKA and has set up subsidiary offices in several African states, including Ghana, to further consolidate its cooperation with the continent based on numerous policy goals (Buğra & Chris, 2022). Apart from TIKA’s activities, Türkiye assisted Africa by collaborating with other international organizations. For instance, Türkiye sent millions of euros to the World Health Organization (WHO), World Food Programme (WFP), and Red Crescent to assist many African countries in coping with natural disasters such as drought throughout the last ten years (Turkish Foreign Ministry, 2016). Türkiye donated half a million dollars in 2009 to the African Union budgetary support and 3.5 million dollars in humanitarian relief through the World Food Program in 2008. The fourth international conference on the 49 least developed nations was held in Istanbul, Türkiye in the first part of 2011. Thirty-three of these countries, including Ghana, are in Africa, and Türkiye provided $20 million for development initiatives in these countries during a similar meeting in 2007.

A crucial component of Türkiye’s worldwide diplomatic strategy is humanitarianism (Mohammed, 2021). Indeed, humanitarianism has undoubtedly served as the cornerstone of Türkiye’s foreign-policy strategy. With a $7.28 billion grant across Africa and some parts of Asia, Türkiye spent the largest amount of humanitarian aid in 2017. Türkiye rose to the top of the global humanitarian aid-to-GDP ratio ranking, with 0.85% of its national income allocated to humanitarian projects. Türkiye generally used a variety of Turkish non-governmental entities to carry out humanitarian work in Ghana. One such Turkish humanitarian organization, the Aziz Mahmud Hudayi Foundation, still offers various forms of assistance to Ghanaians throughout the country. The foundation’s initiatives revolve around health, education, and supply of portable water. According to Mr. Ramazan Ariturk, president of Hudayi Ghana, as of July 2019, the foundation had built over 100 wells and boreholes across Ghana. Additionally, the Hudayi Foundation constructed Ghana’s biggest Islamic complex, the largest in the West African subregion. The complex includes a state-of-the-art senior high school with boarding facilities, planned health center, and ultra-modern national mosque. Over the years, TIKA and the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) have provided various forms of humanitarian help to several Ghanaian organizations. Currently, Turkish humanitarian organizations that are in active operation across Ghana are the HAYRAT, REEBAT, and MAARIF foundations, among other Turkish humanitarian organizations. According to TIKA, Türkiye’s worldwide bilateral official development aid for Ghana is 4.49% (Chedia, 2023).

Trade and Economic Cooperation

Instead of being based on conditions, Türkiye’s trade and economic ties with Ghana and many other African nations are structured in win-win agreements. By keeping its distance from Ghana’s political affairs and issues boarded on national sovereignty, Türkiye has been able to set itself apart from other players such as the US, China, and Russia. Thus, Türkiye has escaped the mistrust that Ghanaians often have for other nations, thanks to this strategy. Türkiye made a significant contribution to Ghana’s economic growth through a variety of business endeavors (Jeffrey, 2022). A bilateral agreement to promote commerce between the Ghana Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Council of Foreign Economic Relations (DEIK) of Türkiye was signed during President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Ghana. Following this agreement, the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Türkiye (TUSKON) sent an invitation to Mrs. Hannah Tetteh, the then Minister of Trade and Industry for Ghana, to attend the “Türkiye-World Trade Bridge 2011 Conference,” which was held in Istanbul from June 14 to 20, 2011. The influx of Turkish companies and people into the trade and investment sectors has been the main driver of Türkiye’s long-term economic assistance to Ghana.

An estimated USD 175 million was traded bilaterally between Ghana and Türkiye in 2009, whereas USD 290 million was traded in 2010. Trade volume between the two nations reached USD 480 million in 2016, according to Mrs. Penbe Nesrin Beyazit, the former Turkish ambassador to the Republic of Ghana, with a new goal of USD 1 billion in commerce by 2020. During his official visit to Ghana, President Erdogan expressed similar views and christened Ghana as Türkiye’s fourth largest sub-Saharan African trading partner. The president also underscored Türkiye’s intention to reach USD one billion in bilateral trade with Ghana by 2020. Ghana’s energy sector has also been recognized by Türkiye as a focal point of its economic engagement with the country. Ghana would receive 450 megawatts of energy from Karpowership, a subsidiary of the Turkish corporation, Karadeniz Holding, under a 10-year agreement endorsed by the two nations in 2014. The “Power of Friendship to Ghana” effort has so far helped improve Ghana’s electricity challenges.

The 2015 quarterly report from the Ghana Investment Promotion Center (GIPC) indicated that, with a value of USD 301.36 million, Türkiye accounted for the largest number of valued investments in Ghana. Additionally, the two nations have signed several memoranda of understanding to deepen their economic relationships. According to the Ghana-Türkiye Chamber of Commerce, the yearly value of trade between Ghana and Türkiye is expected to reach USD 900 million and surpass USD 1 billion by the end of 2025 and 2027, respectively. Ghana and Türkiye’s overall trade value as of 2020 was USD 771 million, a significant increase from USD 479 million in 2016. Notably, the nation became Türkiye’s third largest sub-Saharan African trading partner in 2019. That did, however, decline in 2021 and 2022 due to general global circumstances, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russian-Ukraine war, among others.

While the present trajectory of bilateral trade between the two countries is encouraging, the Chamber’s Chief Executive Officer, Dr. Daniel Amateye Anim-Prempeh, noted that extending trade areas and strengthening contacts will ensure that trade increases more quickly. Ghana’s main exports to Türkiye have historically been soybean, cocoa paste, and cocoa beans; the export value has increased steadily at an annualized rate of 11.3 percent. By contrast, Türkiye has been a major exporter of building supplies, pasta, and cement to Ghana. However, these two countries trade only a negligible number of services. Consequently, Dr. Anim-Prempeh emphasized the wealth of prospects that Ghanaian companies have in Türkiye’s thriving manufacturing industry. The CEO of the Chamber indicated that “Türkiye produces high-quality goods at competitive prices, and its strategic location makes it a very competitive country to do business with.” However, he recognized difficulties that might obstruct commercial dealings, such as lengthy processing times for entrance clearance and expensive visa costs. He further elaborated that “in every endeavor there are bottlenecks; simply put, challenges, feedback, and complaints from Ghanaian businesses are that it takes time for the embassy in Accra to process their entry clearance. Equally, we have received complaints from their Turkish counterparts about the high visa fees charged by our embassy in Ankara. Such developments may impede the smooth facilitation of business transactions” (Awal, 2023).

Another avenue for enhancing Türkiye-Ghana bilateral ties is tourism (Balcı & Boztaş, 2021). These two countries have rich historical, cultural, and tourism attractions. In 2019, Türkiye welcomed over 51.7 million visitors. Bilateral ties are anticipated to improve through cooperation in this area, especially Turkish Airlines’ attempts to entice Ghanaians to go to Türkiye. In highlighting Türkiye’s potential for business, sports, and medical tourism, Dr. Anim-Prempeh postulated that:

My visit to Türkiye put me in a position to boldly state that they have developed their tourist sector with first-class roads to the tourist sites and available and affordable hotels for all levels of income—hence the need to learn and leverage on it. Medical, sports, and business tourism are also worth considering. Indeed, it is estimated that Türkiye is one of the prominent health tourism destinations in the world, operating about 1,500 world-class hospitals and about 16,000 doctors, making it capable of providing high-standard health care delivery (Awal, 2023).

Türkiye-Ghana Defence-Related Relations

Türkiye’s engagement in Africa has been characterized by a mix of both hard and soft elements of diplomacy since 2016, when Türkiye marked a new turning point in its foreign policy. Following the July 2016 military coup attempt and the ensuing arms embargo imposed by some Western allies in reaction to Türkiye’s military actions in northern Syria, Türkiye has been actively seeking new allies, especially in Africa, and developing its defence industry. These events forced Türkiye to expand its defense industry more quickly to decrease its need for Western military assistance. The most noteworthy examples of Turkish military hardware developments are the Bayraktar TB-2 surveillance and combat drones, which have received significant “notoriety” for their precision since being utilized in the crises in Libya, Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine. These drones are said to be as effective as those made in the West, but they are more affordable, available to less-developed countries, and free from political limitations and conditions. President Erdoğan made a clear allusion to the widespread use of Turkish drones in Africa when he visited Nigeria, Angola, and Togo in 2021. He said, ‘Everywhere I go in Africa, everyone asks about UAVs (Agence France-Presse, 2021).

As I have already indicated in this paper and elsewhere, relations between Ghana and Türkiye date back to 1958, when the two countries established diplomatic relations. However, in 1981, Türkiye closed its mission in Accra for economic reasons. Ankara resumed its relationship with Ghana in 2010 because of the country’s political stability and increased economic opportunities. The new levels of interest and mutual relations between the two countries witnessed an official state visit in 2011 by Abdullah Gul, the President of the Republic of Türkiye at the time, with over 200 high personalities, including businessmen. The visit provided impetus for bilateral negotiations and discussions between the two countries in various areas of interest, especially in defense.

On March 24, 2011, during the visit, authorized officials of the two nations discussed and signed an agreement on military cooperation in the fields of science, technology, and training. The agreement aimed at improving the parties’ collaboration in diverse fields, such as cooperation in military training instructions, military intelligence, military institutions and contract visits, and military health services, among others. This agreement provides both countries with great opportunities to improve the training, logistics, and infrastructure of their armed forces. It will also assist the Ghana Armed Forces in their transition from dry to wet lease systems in UN peacekeeping operations. Officials from the Ghana Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney-General’s Department, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry were consulted for their input at all levels of discussion between the two parties.

In the area of training, technology, and scientific cooperation in the military field, Parliament urged the consideration of a proposal for ratification of the framework agreement concluded by the Government of the Republic of Türkiye with the Government of Ghana. The ratification of the agreement will further strengthen the relationship between the two sister countries and, at the same time, assist the Ghana Armed Forces in improving their professional and technical capabilities through training and exchange of technology.

Türkiye-Ghana’s Future Diplomatic Ties: Prospects and Challenges

Several factors must be considered when assessing the prospects of diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Ghana. First, the positive impact of Türkiye’s “opening up” policy towards Africa on its global reputation and status is of greater concern for Turkish state officials and non-state bureaucrats from all over the world. Like most of its counterparts in the global south, such as Brazil, China, and India, Türkiye uses a few mechanisms to enhance its position within an increasingly complex transnational system. In this context, one of Türkiye’s foreign policy measures to strengthen its position as a middle power in the global political landscape was to establish strategic relations with Africa. Given the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucrats’ general acceptance of Türkiye’s strategic foreign policy and diplomatic discourse in Africa, any change in political leadership at the highest levels of the state is unlikely to have a significant impact on the current structure of Ankara's actively engaged foreign policy relations with Ghana. In addition, in view of the pace at which international trade agreements are negotiated, Türkiye is expected to develop more adaptive and tailored bilateral trade agreements with African countries, including Ghana. The reason for this lag is that because of the residual impact left by previous imperial powers in those countries, some African countries may still not be able to make independent decisions on the scope of their economic diplomacies.

Furthermore, Türkiye could take a more active role in maximizing the potential of its human capital by making the country attractive to Turkish graduates of Ghanaian descent who can speak fluent Turkish and are thus able to appreciate beautiful ancient Turkish culture. In view of Türkiye’s perspective in diplomatic circles that its foreign policy trajectory in Ghana is different from that of other external powers in the country, the placement of Ghanaian graduates at the heart of Turkish foreign policy could be a valuable contribution to strengthening the Turkish-Ghana cooperation paradigm. Similarly, the country could enhance cooperation with Ghana at a high level by raising the number of yearly scholarships awarded to Ghanaian students and organizing cultural exchange programs with selected interested communities in Ghana, given that Türkiye has identified its policy strategy for Ghana as people-centered, which is based on some key similarities between certain types of culture and education. This series of efforts will build on previous endeavors, including the establishment of the Yunus Emre Institutes and Maarif schools in several African countries.

Finally, it can be expected that Türkiye’s policy options in Ghana will be hit by setbacks in the next decade, given the global inflation surge and Türkiye’s deteriorating economic situation, which will result in an unbearable burden on the population. These developments, as well as the increase in Türkiye’s military spending, have weighed heavily on its own reserves and could have a direct negative impact on the expanding Turkish presence in Ghana, particularly with respect to social partnership. In the next few years, it is likely that Türkiye will witness a sharp decline in the volume of aid to sub-Saharan Africa. However, the scope of the bilateral trading platform will continue to expand because Türkiye’s internal manufacturing capacity will continue to grow despite the economic downturn, and the adverse effects of the lira’s continued depreciation in value may incentivize African businessmen to purchase more products from Türkiye because these products will be relatively less expensive and cost-effective in some African countries.

The question is how Ghana can leverage its surging diplomatic ties with Türkiye to make a difference in the country’s economy and its infant democracy. Ghana’s ties with Türkiye must fulfil certain criteria to advance its priorities. First, from an economic perspective, it is essential to reduce the restrictions on trade that are now in place between Türkiye and Ghana. Ghanaians are curious about Turkish goods, which are praised for being economical and comparable in quality to Western goods. However, the double taxation at the checkpoints in Türkiye and Ghana significantly hinders the exploitation of the already available commercial potential. Signing free trade agreements that will increase commercial cooperation between Türkiye and Ghana is necessary to enhance bilateral trade relations.

In terms of investment, it should not be a one-lane transaction; rather, Ghanaians should start investing in Türkiye to obtain the benefits that this symbiotic relationship will bring to both countries. Only a few Ghanaians have made investments in Türkiye, and all of them are concentrated in the logistics sector, shipping goods from Türkiye to Ghana, but there should be more diverse investment markets. This is also true for Türkiye, where most investors are attracted to the mining sector in Ghana. This emphasis should be equally diversified to include viable job-creating industries, such as business establishment and technology transfer, to refine the raw minerals found in Ghana. Additionally, it is important that Ghanaian officials reach an agreement with their Turkish counterparts to facilitate the issuing of visas for nationals wishing to visit Türkiye for business. Mutual investment protection agreements should be signed between Türkiye and Ghana to reduce administrative formalities and provide investors on both sides with guarantees.

Second, Ghanaian students who have graduated from Turkish universities are in a strong position to strengthen relations with Türkiye because of their ability to speak the Turkish language and adapt to Turkish culture. Unfortunately, these potentials have not yet been exploited by Ghanaian authorities, and graduates from Türkiye academic institutions are hardly integrated into their foreign policy plans for Türkiye. The Turkish side has been trying to take advantage of this potential by hiring Ghanaian students at business fairs in Türkiye and Ghana. However, since 2012, when Türkiye began operating a scholarship scheme unilaterally, Ghanaian authorities have been annoyed by the exclusion of their government from Turkish government scholarship processes. Admittedly, the Ghanaian authorities may not be sufficiently informed of the identity and number of students receiving Turkish scholarships, since Ghana has not yet fully digitized its public systems. Türkiye needs to work more closely with Ghana’s government on the scholarship program to remedy this situation, and both sides need to improve coordination between their education and foreign affairs ministries. The Turkish Embassy in Ghana can inform Ghanaian authorities about the departure and return of Ghanaian students and their intellectual and professional expertise.

Third, by working closely with the African Union, Ghana should be able to exert greater control over its relationship with Türkiye and other development partners. This enhanced ownership implies that, rather than dealing with Türkiye separately on several issues, African countries would benefit from coordinating their activities within the framework of the AU on several key issues such as trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Ghana must avoid replicating its unequal relationship with other developing countries by not putting all its financial commitments to Türkiye into its diplomatic activities. Ghanaian businesses also need to be aware of the value of what they can offer Türkiye. As a result, they should develop an equal partnership with Türkiye, as they will have a voice at the negotiating table with their Turkish counterparts if they do not rely on Türkiye’s financial resources. Ghanaian and Turkish markets are expanding rapidly, with enormous potential that can be fully exploited for the benefit of both countries. Nonetheless, the criteria are to increase Ghana’s production capacity and market size by increasing external trade exchanges in the West African subregion.

Finally, yet importantly, colonial rule introduced Europeans to Ghana, irrevocably transforming the country. Today, European institutions have had a profound impact on Ghana’s culture during the exploitation process in the colonies. This does not mean that Europe and the West should be completely excluded from African solutions, although there is currently a focus on adopting African ideas as an approach to resolving African problems. In particular, in the fields of health, education, and science, there is no doubt that Europe and the West are still going to have a significant impact on Ghana. However, Ghana must view this impact in the right context and give up the Western construct of what Ghana should be in favor of one that is Ghanaian-centered. Anti-Western sentiments that have recently characterized the aftermaths of the coup d'états in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, and Niger are not isolated and should not be taken for granted. Türkiye’s relationship with Ghana is particularly important in this context. Unlike in Western countries, Türkiye’s relationship with Ghana is not shrouded in a master-former-slave mindset. In other words, mutual development is the focus. Thus, for Ghana to engage effectively with Türkiye, leaders should redesign the country’s educational institutions and wean itself from colonial-inherited academic curricula that only focus on mastering Western academic terminologies without any skills in entrepreneurship or personal growth. There is a ‘backlog’ of teeming unemployed youth in the country. There is a need to encourage the use of native languages in important areas such as universities to increase citizens’ involvement in policy and economic development. Owing to the low patronage of Ghanaian languages abroad, Ghanaians are likely to continue to rely on European languages to enter the international market.

Ghana's integration into contemporary global industrialization is undeniable, a process historically facilitated by colonialism. Yet, despite this legacy, the country has the capacity to reform its institutions and build more accountable, transparent, and participatory systems of governance and economic management that reduce reliance on external, particularly Western, assistance. Institutional reforms could also promote the use of Ghanaian languages in literature and education, thereby fostering a stronger cognitive and cultural foundation among citizens. Such initiatives would not only enhance economic and political participation but also broaden public understanding of Ghana's place within the evolving global order. While Ghana has made notable progress in establishing and sustaining democratic institutions alongside efforts to strengthen its economy, the prevailing Western-style democratic framework has, in practice, often enabled corrupt political practices and the misappropriation of national resources. This situation underscores the urgent need for critical intellectual engagement with alternative political models that more effectively serve the interests and aspirations of the wider population.

Conclusion

Türkiye’s reengagement with Ghana is largely motivated by the long-term approach of Ankara in its foreign policy and can be appreciated from this perspective. Much of the high-level political discussion among Turkish political leaders regarding economic growth and humanitarian relief in Africa is rooted in this commitment. Türkiye seems to be on a foreign policy course that might eventually lead to its diplomatic and economic alliances becoming more diverse. For instance, Türkiye was keen to reduce its economic reliance on Russia and other long-standing trading partners in Europe by pursuing measures such as “opening up” to the African continent. Türkiye is aware that global politics are undergoing significant changes, and in a fast-evolving world system, it is essential to make shrewd political choices, seek new partners, or plan responses to emerging geopolitical challenges.

In particular, the outcomes of both domestic policy reforms in Türkiye and geopolitical economic changes at the international level make Ankara more open to countries in Africa. Türkiye is under some form of diplomatic pressure from its “ancient” economic allies in the context of an internal revolution, which has led it to seek a broader range of trade options that take into account the changing global political and social balances. As a result of changes in the global system, countries have determined their interests in emerging international political instability and power imbalances. Türkiye has responded to these developments by creating a multifaceted foreign policy and building economic and political relations with its neighbours and other parts of the world. The new concept of “opening up” to Africa is also a part of this new Turkish foreign policy formulation. Ultimately, increased Turkish involvement in Ghana, particularly, and Africa as a whole, on a political and economic level, represents a smooth convergence of corporate and governmental ambitions, even though the new multifaceted foreign policy has established the theoretical groundwork for “opening up to Africa.” It is noteworthy to assert that Ankara’s rekindled interest in continental Africa has become increasingly significant in terms of opening new markets as a method to mitigate the effects of the international economic catastrophe after the ongoing global economic downturn, perhaps because of the aftereffects of the coronavirus and the current wars in Gaza and Ukraine. Given that it now has a robust foundation to revitalize the economy and strong public support at home to back it, Türkiye’s increasing diplomatic engagement with Ghana is expected to persist in the near future and garner many favorable responses from Ghanaians.

Conflict of Interest

The author declares that he does not have any conflict of interest.